

The Unwanted Metonymy of The 1804 Usman Dan Fodio's Jihad To

The Contemporary Nigerian State

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### **Abstract**

This paper analyzes the eruption of some covert religio-political militant movements modeled after the 1804 Usman dan Fodio's jihad who are engrossed with the penchant desire for launching jihads in Nigeria. It discusses also the Maitatsine's imbroglio, Izala, the Shiites, the sharia propagandists between 1978 and 1999, Boko Haram's insurgency and Fulani herdsmen onslaughts. It highlights the dangers of these disguised movements to the Nigerian socio political and economic existence and suggests some ways of checkmating their excesses.

### **Introduction**

Some scholars, thinkers and authors argued that in the middle years of the twentieth century secularism and scientific discoveries would make religion irrelevant in the general affairs of mankind. However, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, religious movements took forceful forms. One of the outcomes of this awakening is the Islamic war known as "jihad". By the nineteenth century, the religious flavour of jihad had hit Nigeria, Africa and the

entire world badly. The war under consideration took place in ancient northern Nigeria around 1804 led by Sheik Usman dan Fodio. The war made the ancient Hausa land witness remarkable events that have come to be reference point for many generations after. One of these marks is the conquering of independent kingdoms and replacing them with Fulani emirs. Close to a century after the jihad, the colonialist arrived and unified these conquered kingdoms with other tribes that were not hitherto part of the areas and thus formed the present day Nigeria. About fifty-six years ago, this forcefully amalgamated tribes secured the so-called independence from their colonial masters. At that independence, they had unreserved expectations and dreams of sustaining the amalgamation with the aim of building a nation where even though tongues and tribes differ, brotherhood, fairness, equity, equality and justice should reign. But all these hopes are on their path to destructive collision because just like Usman dan Fodio took up arms against the kings of Hausa land in 1804, that has been how other deadly movements have taken up missiles against the Nigerian state. These movements have not only disquieted Nigerians but have also reduced the country to a mere robot.

#### **Clarification Of Terms**

*Unwanted* is an adjectival form of some negative words such as needless, unnecessary, undesired, not wished, not needed, irrelevant and generally not beneficial and needful. *Metonymy* is a noun word meaning the method of referring something by another name for something else that is closely connected to it. *Contemporary* implies a person or thing living or existing at the same time as another. *Nigeria state* according to Meek (1925), is a name given by Flora Shaw, who later became the wife of Lord Lugard, the first Nigerian Colonial GovernorGeneral (p.59). Nigeria can be briefly defined as the conglomerates of nations that

were forcefully amalgamated into one country in 1914 but on 1<sup>st</sup> October, 1960, it gained political independence from Britain. *Usman dan Fodio's Jihad* in view of Kukah (1993) is a war launched by Usman dan Fodio in 1804 with the aim of establishing Islamic state (p.115).

Contextually, *the Unwanted Metonymy of the 1804 Usman dan Fodio's Jihad to the Contemporary Nigerian State* implies the dangerous effects of the activities of some disguised religio militant movements championing the continued the 1804 jihad of Usman dan Fodio. It analyses the general implications of these movements to survival of Nigerian existence as a country. The study is enthused by the fact that the current sultan of Sokoto, Saa'd Abubakar in (1999) affirms that the 1804 Usman dan Fodio's jihad ended in 1809 but fighting for the establishment of emirates as parts of wider caliphate did not end (p.303).

#### Theoretical Framework

The study employs Functionalist and Conflict theories and Iruonagbe (2013) avers that Durkheim one of the proponents of Functionalist theory believes that social life is impossible without the shared values and moral beliefs that form the collective conscience. The absence of the aforementioned threatens social order, social control, social solidarity or cooperation and the unity of the people (p.5). Coser (1956), one of the disciples of the foremost originator of the conflict theory, Karl Marx, said that conflict is a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals (p.3). Ani (2012) affirms that conflict manifests as products of interactions amongst human beings and groups who plot to outwit others (p.158). This theory is used because it implies that conflict is generated by the quests to protect one's identity and maximize one's interest.

Functionalist theory is employed because religion is one of the factors that a society needs to properly function. These are social theories that shape the concept of continuity of ideology. Therefore, the society will be in danger if religion refuses to perform or functions negatively. It is used to highlight the dangers of how a dysfunctional religion can retard the growth and progress of the Nigerian state.

**The Metonymy Of The 1804 Usman Dan Fodio's Jihad To The  
Contemporary Nigerian State**

In view of the above, Paden (1986) asserts that the Izala movement, Muslim Students Societies (MSS), the National Council on Muslim Youth Organizations (NACOMYO) and Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) are some of the leading Islamic organizations in Nigeria which have continued with the vision of the Usman dan Fodio's jihad in Nigeria (p.275). Olupona (1991) emphatically affirms that the Usman dan Fodio's 1804 jihad is being carried on by the formation of organizations, movements, unions, associations and groups in the Nigerian Islamic religion. These organizations and movements include the Quadiriyya group, the foremost Jam'tu Nasril Islam (JNI), Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (SCIA), the Muslim Student's Society (MSS), Izala movement, the Fityanu'l Islam (the Youngmen of Islam) and other later foundations (pp.37-41). The rise of Izala movement in northern Nigeria as a reform movement according to Loimeier (1997), drew heavily on the legacy of earlier Islamic reformers, al-Maghīlī and Usman dan Fodio (p.286). Back (2008) argues that the Izala movement was the first to vehemently take up the purification agenda and legacy of Usman dan Fodio in the post-independence era (pp. 427-428). Akaeze (2009) from every manifestation traces the Boko Haram movement to the Maitatsine (p.14).

Nwanaju (2012) admits that Islamic movements such as Derika, Izala, Kaulu (Kablu), the Muslim Brothers, Tijjaniya, Quaddiriya, Shiite, Muslim Brotherhood, Maitatsine, the Yusufiya group later known as Boko Haram and several other splinter groups have actually been engrossed with the mission of Usman dan Fodio in Nigeria. Notwithstanding their different names and appendages, they are still working towards one purpose (p.38). Adesoji (2012) also traces the origin of Boko Haram back to the *Yan Tatsine* of the 1980s (p.101). Thomson (2012) said that just like the Maitatsine group, the Boko Haram insurgency could be traced to the Usman dan Fodio's jihad because both of them demanded the institutionalization of sharia in the society (p.47). Pérouse (2014) said that the Izala movement established schools and centers known as *Fudiyah*, named after Usman dan Fodio. He maintains that Usman dan Fodio's legacy of purification has also taken up by the Shiites. Mohamed Yusuf continued to pay respect to Usman dan Fodio and the jihad of 1804, which was linked to the Qadiriyya (p.26). Searcy (2016) affirms that a moderate' splinter group of Boko Haram, Ansaru, openly referred to the Sokoto Caliphate and Usman dan Fodio as models for their movements (p.5). Nwanaju (2012) argues that it is not surprising that Boko Haram has become an avenue for the extension of the revolutionary zeal of the Usman dan Fodio's Jihad of 1804 (p.38). Asigwe (2013) posits that Mohammed Yusuf's uncle was one of the senior commanders of Maitatsine group but he

narrowly escaped from Kano to Maiduguri during the heavy military onslaught against the sect (p.12). Omokri (2013) confirms that Mohammed's uncle raised Yusuf as a child and after the death of many members of the group during the Maitatsine riots, another respectable commander of the sect named, Musa Makaniki escaped from Kano to Gombe and later

retreated to Cameroon, where he remained until 2004 when he was arrested in Nigeria and was sentenced to death. But he was upon appeal freed in May, 2012 (p.9).

Wadlow (2015) emphasizes that the current leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, as well as other movements looks up to 1804 Usman dan Fodio's jihad as a model to be followed. Although radically different in many ways, Boko Haram is part of the long shadow of Usman dan Fodio (p.23). Zenn (2015) adds that Boko Haram views itself as the successor to Usman dan

Fodio (p.13). Morre (2016) sums it up by adding that after the Usman dan Fodio's 1804 jihad, the Fulani group integrated into Hausa ethnic group of northern Nigeria (p.7). With all these submissions, it is obvious that contrary to some scholars' positions that the 1804 Usman dan Fodio's jihad ended in 1810, the war has not ended. Therefore, six of these identified groups which have been influenced and inspired by the 1804 Usman dan Fodio's jihad are briefly discussed.

#### **The Maitatisine**

The name Maitatisine is used interchangeably with *kala kato* meaning according to Kukah (2010) "the one always curses". Maitatisine was the name of the followers of late Muhammad Marwa, who migrated from the town of Marwa in Northern Cameroun to the city of Kano around 1945. While in Kano, he became an Islamic zealot who was concerned with the purification of Islam. His Islamic practice was based on his personal interpretation of Islam. Marwa proclaimed himself prophet among his followers and considered those who opposed him being a prophet as infidels and deserved to be killed (pp.10-14). Imam (2004) adds that Maitatisine regarded the Quran as the only source of guidance and rejected other sources of Islamic guidance such as Hadith and Sunna. Other aspects of their practice include the

proclamation as pagan anyone who says *Allahu Akbar* in prayers, rides on a bicycle, motorcycle or reads another book other than the Quran. The Maitastine group appeared to be self disciplined, seldom chat or engage in talk with others and when they do, it is strictly on business. Despite these attributes, a number of people were apprehensive of their type of Islamic practice. They were responsible for the first ever major religious crisis witnessed in Maiduguri and subsequently in other parts of the northern Nigeria. After the city of Kano went aflame for four days in December 1980, with the loss of over four thousand lives, in 2004, violent clashes was recorded from them at Zabarmari in Maiduguri (pp.85-94).

Clarke and Linden (1982) explain that Marwa exploited the dwindling economic situation and the *Almajeri* system and was able to attract large followers amongst the commoners. These commoners were people who were unable to afford the basic necessities of life hence they became die-hard patriots of the sect (p.122). Danjibo (2012) submits that Maitatsines preached with strong compulsion to kill. They believed that if they were able to kill *Arnas* (infidels) who do not believe in Allah, they will go to heaven (p.37).

**Jama'atu Izalatul Bid'a wa Iqatamus Sunna (JIBWIS or Izala)**

Olupona (1991) sees it as an association or movement that claimed to eliminate innovation and the restoration of Sunna. It has brought great challenges to the practices of the Sufi Brotherhoods. Like the Maitatsine, they question practices that are not reported in the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet or *ijma*. Amidst this challenge, rivalry between the established sufi orders and the Izala often ensued (p.40). Aliyu (1999) posits that since 1990, Izala became divided into two factions, one faction popularly referred to as “Bush Izala” with its base in Jos led by late Sheikh Samaila Idris and the other “Saddam Izala” based in Kaduna under late Sheikh Musa Maigandu (p.49). Dikko (2000) notes that several issues, factors and events led

to this division but majorly the Gulf War in the 1990s was probably the final incident that divided the two groups. When the “Bush camp” argued that the war was not a religious one because of its belief that Saddam Hussein did not deserve Muslim sympathy, the Saddam’s group took to the contrary (p.69). Iwuchukwu (2014) affirms that *Izalatul Bid'a wa Iqatamus Sunna* (Association for the elimination of innovation and the restoration of Sunna) is Sufi movement that rise to prominence in Nigeria and has remained unchallenged in the past three decades. This group arrogated to themselves the exclusive responsibility of fighting and addressing the alleged corruption of Islam by the Qadiriyya and Tijanniya brotherhoods (pp.9-13).

#### **Nigerian Muslim Brotherhood-the Shiites**

Fage (1990) said that the Shiites are those who believe that the ascendancy to the Caliphate must come from the direct descendants of Mohammed, the progenitor of Islam, as represented by his son-in-law Ali and his only surviving child, Fatimah (pp.149-150). The origin and development of the Shiite movement of Nigeria began in the late 1970s and 1980s. Aside from other local influences and Saudi financial support, the Iranian revolution of 1979 made strong impact on the Shiites. The success of that Islamic Revolution instilled in many Nigerian Muslim youths the possibility of using Islam as a vehicle for political and social transformation and that was a major source of Islamic radicalization in Nigeria. Similar to the Izala group, Imam (2004), two groups of Shiites are observed in Nigeria and they are Islamic Movement of Nigeria

(IMN) led by Sheikh Ibrahim El Zakzaky and the Rasulul A'azam Foundation (RAAF) under the leadership of Sheikh Muhammad Nura Dass. The two groups existed and operated as one Shiite movement until 1992 when it split into two because some members could no longer bear

the alleged confrontational nature of Sheikh Ibrahim ElZakzaky's attitude towards the governmentan attitude they believed was only inspired by the Iranian Revolution (p.88).

Hosen (2004) avers that on the contrary, RAAF prides itself as the only orthodox Shiite organization in Nigeria based on the teachings of Imam Jaafar. While IMN sees nothing good in the Nigerian State due to its secular nature and the injustices perpetrated by its leaders, RAAF did not only recognizes the state as legitimate but also argues that it must be obeyed (pp.144147). Like many other Islamic movements in Nigeria, the aim of this group has been to enforce Sharia. El-Zakzaky encouraged his followers to recapture Nigeria for Allah in the same way Ayatollah did during the Iranian revolution of 1979. The crises of April 1991 related to this group cannot be easily forgotten. The group has been in constant fracas with Nigerian security agencies leading to hundreds of deaths. The leader is currently under federal government detention even when he was released by the court, Federal government has not obeyed the judgment.

#### **Sharia Propagandists between 1978 and 1999**

Right from the pre-colonial era, when Usman dan Fodio through his jihad conquered and established Sharia in some parts of Northern Nigeria till today, the issue of Sharia has been a contentious issue in Nigeria. On the eve of independence, its scope was limited and formally excluded from the legal system of independent Nigeria when the Islamic court of appeal was abolished in 1967. However, some aspects of Sharia were used as part of "area" or customary law practiced at village level. Between 1977 and 1978 during the drafting of a new civilian constitution, the issue again resurfaced.

According to Kukah (2010), at the Fourth Republic dispensation, the country was greeted with deadly ethno religious crises in Zakibiam in Benue, Odi in Bayelsa and Kaduna

states among others. The dusts raised by the crises were about to settle down and people were about counting their losses and struggling to get back to full normalcy, suddenly, the then Governor of Zamfara State, Ahmed Sani Yerima, triggered off another crises by declaring that Zamfara State had introduced the criminal Sharia code. By this measure, he nullified the Nigerian constitution indirectly. He banned the sale of alcohol, nightclubs and restrained women from entering the same vehicle with men. A woman could not ride on a motorcycle unless the rider was the husband of the woman and other controversial laws. Like these were not enough and to prove his seriousness, a man lost his hand for allegedly stealing of a goat and a woman was threatened to be stoned to death for adultery and these led to international uproars (pp.73-84). Modupe (2000) said that other eleven states in the north followed suit (p.8). Lemuel (2010) notes that the violence with its orgy of killings between 1999 and 2003, began in the North sporadically spread to other parts of Southern Nigerian towns p.8). The crisis was so deep that it rocked the North and Nigeria for years. Arguably, the actions of Sani Yerima emboldened other politicians especially those who usually engage religion to achieve their end. The resultant effect was scary, deadly and probably spurred the emergence Boko Haram.

*Jamaatul Alhul Sunnah Lidda wati wal Jihad* -Boko Haram

Johnson (2011) avers that *jamaatul Alhul Sunnah Lidda wati wal jihad* *Jihad* meaning Boko Haram is an Arabicized-Hausa terminology that is simply translated into “western education is sinful”. They believed that they are committed to the Hadith of Prophet Muhammad’s teachings and Islamic jihad. There are confusing theories that have been generated in attempts to explain the Boko Haram’s challenge, its origin and modes or purposes of operation. For instance, Nwanaju (2010) and Adibe (2012) observe that while the

popular belief is that it was founded around 2001 or 2002, they trace the date to as far back as 1995. Oviasogie (2013) said that Boko Haram emerged immediately after 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States of America. The exact date of the emergence of Boko Haram is mired with controversies. Nevertheless, they were known to the Nigerian authority to have existed since 1995 under the name of *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra*--“congregation of followers of the prophet involved in the call to Islam and religious struggle”. The sect subsequently flourished under various names such as the “Nigerian Taliban”, *Yusufiyah* sect and the current Boko Haram (pp.25-27).

Oviasogie (2013) maintains that on the 21<sup>st</sup> September, 2004, the group attacked Bama and Gwora police stations in Borno State, killing several policemen, stealing arms and ammunition and later set the Gwoza police station ablaze. Apart from a few isolated skirmishes with the police, the sect received marginal attention until the middle of 2007 and again in 2008 when they came under surveillance by security operatives in Abuja. In July 2009, members of the sect staged the most spectacular attacks on all institutions that represent the Nigerian state. The uprising affected five northern states, namely Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina and Yobe. A military campaign led to the controversial killing of over seven hundred (700) members of the group including the leader, Muhammed Yusuf, while several others were arrested and detained (p.25). Since then, Boko Haram has risen to be the most dangerous groups Nigeria has ever had after Fulani herdsmen and they have brought Nigeria to a standstill.



Pix 1. showing the deadly attack of the Boko Haram at St Theresa's Catholic church Madalla Suleja Niger state. Sourced from Vanguard newspaper on 29<sup>th</sup> Feb, 2016.



Pix 2. Showing the deadly bombing of the Nigerian Police Headquarters in Abuja by the Boko Haram. Sourced from <http://www.nigeriasite.com/images/niger.comjpg>. 23rd April, 2015.

#### The Onslaughts of Fulani Herdsmen

Fulani are nomadic herders whose history according to Morre (2016) can be traced to the Futa Jalon mountains of West Africa. They are largely located in the Sahel and semi arid parts of West Africa but due to changes in climate pattern, many of the herdsmen moved further

south into the savannah and tropical forest belt of West Africa. He maintains that the history of Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria dates back to the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries when they started migrating into northern Nigeria from Senegambia region. Tamionu (2016) maintains that judging from the antecedent of the jihad mover, the trails of bloody grazing by the Fulani herdsmen in the southern part of Nigeria looks like a part of the long time grand design to complete the jihad of Usman dan Fodio whose major objective was to rule the south from the north-a project that the Fulani group through their herdsmen desire to accomplish (p.9). However, Morre (2016) states that in a bid to tackle their onslaughts, the Federal government in 1978 implemented the Land Use Act which gave the lands occupancy to the Fulani grazing route. Hence the federal government carved out some areas as grazing routes but it has not reduced clashes between farmers and herdsmen (pp.11-14). Mikailu (2016) and Morre (2016) said that no state in Nigeria has not witnessed one or more of its communities being ransacked, maimed, destroyed and desolated by the Fulani herdsmen. According to Isine (2016), the governor of Benue state, Samuel Ortom sums the issue thus “we are completely under siege by the Fulani herdsmen” (p.11).

Since the current administration headed by a Fulani man began in 2015, Fulani herdsmen have gone on killing spree. Most of them are often caught with AK47 assault rifles. It is still very hard to explain the source of these sophisticated ammunitions. In reactions to all these, the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) argues that the Fulani herdsmen’s onslaughts are state sponsored.

They accused president Buhari’s inactions for fuelling the Fulani killing spree. They wondered why a Nigerian president will turn blind eye on the endless killing of innocent and defenceless Nigeria only to condemn other killings in other countries. Ogundele (2016) posits

that the Ekiti state governor, Ayodele Fayose through the state House of Assembly enacted a law banning grazing of cows in Ekiti state (p.12). Probably this prompted the coalition of all ethnic groups in Benue state formed a movement named “Movement Against Fulani Occupation” (MAFO). They are repeatedly on rallies and have taken even Federal government to court because of Fulani herdsmen’ killing. Conclusively, Agande (2016) puts it that the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) reports that Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria ranked the fourth world’s most deadly terror groups in the world(p.13). References to these groups have become very common in the discussions of violence in Nigeria. These sects just like Usman dan Fodio seek to abolish the system of government of Nigeria and annex other tribes with their lands.

#### **Dangers of These Metonymies To The Nigerian Corporeality**

The jihad initiated about two hundred years ago in Hausa land by Usman dan Fodio is being fought from various dimensions under various names and nomenclatures today. It has brought about some destructive developments to the country. Some of these are:

Their activities Cause General Instabilities: Suberu (2001) notes that at the heat of sharia killings in the fourth republic, the *Ohanaeze ndi igbo*, a forum of Pan-Igbo political leaders demanded that the Nigerian army be replaced by six regional armies (p.191). Fasehun (2000) said that ethnic leaders among the Yoruba responded with similar models of demand for decentralization (p.28). Onaiyekan (2003) argues that the agitations to implement Sharia have worked for destabilizing national unity, polarizing the nation along ethnic and religious lines, nurtured fanaticism and breed intolerance where every move in the country is interpreted in the light of confrontation (p.71). Therefore, these agitations are the causes of general instability because it often arouses the consciousness of other ethnic and religious groups to

demand for self-determination. The menace of Fulani herdsmen in their unprecedented destruction of human lives and farmlands across Nigeria have worsened the whole situation as many non Fulani groups in Nigeria are today spitting and threatening fire. Ekiti State has enacted a law that ban grazing in the state and if all other states followed the trend, it then means that Nigerian existence is a foregone issue. The coalition of all ethnic groups in Benue state formed a movement named “Movement Against Fulani Occupation” (MAFO). They had rallies and took both Federal government to court because of Fulani herdsmen’ killing. One wonders the fate of a country where this type of coalition is formed. All these things are capable of ending the existence of Nigeria as one entity because nothing works in the midst of instability.

**It Encourages Bitterness, Rancour and Unforgiveness:** Living in a multi religiocultural society demands tolerance and culture of forgiveness but the contrary is the case in Nigeria. Hence, Lemuel (2010) observes that during the most heated Sharia violence between 1999 and 2003, a riot that began in Kaduna and other parts of the Northern Nigeria sporadically spread to other parts of Southern Nigerian towns such as Umuahia, Aba, Okigwe, Portharcourt, Onitsha, Uyo, Calabar and even some western parts of Nigeria (p.8). It takes unforgiving minds to resort to this kind of approach for settling disputes because, it is difficult to have a society where people will not hurt one another. If everybody takes law into his/her hand, the law enforcement agencies will be needless and lawlessness will set in. Gandhi reasoned that an eye for an eye will make the whole world go blind.

**It Cherishes the Adoption and Adaptation of Violence as a Means to an end:** Iwuchukwu (2014) maintains that the approval of sharia criminal code by twelve northern states led by the Zamfara state in 1999 was spurred by the mission to forcefully Islamize Nigeria beginning

from the north (p.13). It is also evidenced from some of the unguarded and seditious statements of some politicians especially from the Northern elite pointed to the issue of getting political comfort by violence. Binniyat (2012) notes that president Muhammad Buhari who lost the presidential election to former President Jonathan in 2011 came under fire over the threat of bloodshed in Nigeria if the 2015 elections were rigged. He was quoted as having said that “if what happened in 2011 should again happen in 2015, by the grace of God, the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood” (pp.1-5.). In the same vein, Umoru (2012) said that Alhaji Lawal Keita, another prominent northern Nigerian politician issued another political threat to the effect that “the only condition for Nigeria to be one is for the presidency to come to the north in 2015” (p.5). The undeniable fact is that most of these politicians are considered gods and their utterances taken and swallowed by their followers without reservation. When they release these utterances, they become tickets for their armies of followers to launch attacks and when any sitting government gives in to their threats, violence becomes the fashionable path of achieving some aims and objectives.

They Endorse the Abuse of Human Right: Iwe (2002) states that article (3) of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted on 10<sup>th</sup> December, 1948 stipulates that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security” (p.252). Accordingly, Section (33) subsection (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended in 2011, supports it. According to Soniyi (2015), the report of Amnesty International released on the first anniversary of the abduction of the Chibok school girls, accounted that at least two thousand (2000) women and girls have been abducted by Boko Haram between 2014 and January 2015. Most of these women were forcefully imprisoned, some turned into sex slaves while others were trained to fight. Boko Haram adopts brutal methods where men and

boys are regularly conscripted or systematically executed in case of any resistance. Their brutality is unimaginably bad. For instance, couples were publicly executed for allegedly committing adultery. Whenever Boko Haram captured a town, they enforce restrictions on movements and forced the inhabitants to depend on their benevolence for daily meals (p.6). They seem to forget that Ekanola (2011) asserts that people by virtue of their humanity are endowed with some fundamental rights that cannot be justifiably violated or withdraw from them. The respect for and promotion of these rights facilitate peaceful co-existence among the people as well as provide the conditions requisite for the promotion of general well being of people in the society (p.94). The denial and violation of these rights tend to generate and exacerbate conflict and encourage people to resort to violence in an attempt to protect their rights. It ends up breeding anger, hatred, negative feeling, distrust and fear.

**It Breeds Genocide and Economic Waste:** According to Onaiyekan (2003), the 1804 jihad by Usman dan Fodio in Hausa land left unforgettable marks on the psyche of the people. They were so terrorized that small tribes were killed and others forced to accept Islam as a way of survival (p.63). This is not only Human Right Abuse but also genocide. Nigeria has repeatedly lost huge fortunes to sharia crises. These enormous expenditures are spent on security. Lai (2014) notes that the security budget of Nigeria between 2010 and 2015 gulped up to \$32.88 billion dollars over twenty-five percent of the total country's budget (p.6). Ezeobi (2014) affirms that Nigeria allocated 30% of her budgetary allocation with more funds in billions of dollars for security for three years. This huge amount of money was spent on combating insurgency (p.12). Ameh (2016) notes that a finding from the presidential panel set up on the North East Initiative reveals that Nigeria lost more than \$9billion to Boko Haram attacks in Bornu, Yobe and

Adamawa states (p.6). Ideally, this huge money could have helped Nigeria get out of horrible economic recession, provide infrastructure and employments for these teaming unemployed youths. It is impossible to spend that huge sum of money on one item without leaving hundreds of other basic items unattended to.

**Their Activities Create Negative Global Image:** The violence associated with the Maitatsine movement took a global dimension in 1982. BokoHaram blacklisted Nigeria when they bombed the United Nations' Headquarters in Abuja, on 26<sup>th</sup> August, 2011, killing several persons and another successful attack on the Police Headquarters in Abuja. These activities almost announced Nigeria as a failed state within the comity of nations. Salisu, Afandi and Shehu (2015) confirm that Britain put Boko Haram and Ansaru on its official “terrorist group” list in November 2012 (p.2). The dizzy height of it was when Boko Haram on 14<sup>th</sup> April, 2014 abducted over two hundred (200) girls from Government Secondary School at Chibok in Bornu State. Nigerian global image was negative tainted with the launching of the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. Amidst pressure, Nigerian government sought to buy arms from the open market but was denied by the western worlds. But when it sought to buy them from the “black market” the South African Government twice seized undisclosed 9.3 and 5.7 million dollars flown into the country in a private jet. All these have created bad image for Nigeria and bad blood between Nigeria and South Africa. Therefore, Nigeria would not have been in this mess if the jihadists are not destroying Nigerians.

**They Disrupt Social Cohesion and Create Unpatriotic Spirit:** The 1999 Constitution foresaw this danger and stipulates in Section (41) subsection (1) that every citizen of Nigeria is entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part thereof and no citizen of

Nigeria shall be expelled from Nigeria or refused entry thereto or exit there from. But the jihadist activities have defeated this lofty dream. For example, non-Muslims, particularly Christians who live in such States where jihad is being romanced, though a majority in the wider context, had became religious minorities prompting many of them to flee those states. The same is obtained of Muslims in the historically Christian-populated South particularly the southeast, where Muslims have been victims of violent reprisals. It is most likely that the victims of these religious destructions will summarily come to hate the country and all it stands for, thereby killing the spirit of patriotism.

It is Capable of Enthroning and Recycling Mediocre in Leadership: The quests to elongate the 1804 Usman dan Fodio's jihad in Nigeria are capable of enthroning sectional and selfish individuals as rulers in the country. It was the same way Usman dan Fodio forced his Fulani brothers on the emirates of various kingdoms. Nigerian problem has been adroitly reduced to leadership problem. This is simply because of the poor and sinister process of recruiting them into offices. With the amount of power vested on the political rulers in Nigeria, where a president or governor can choose whoever he likes to be anything not minding the capability of the person, the language and solidarity for launching of jihad can recycle and rotate people who have no plan or solution for the challenges of the country and they are not bothered because they are sure of securing support base on their religious leanings. In this case, religious ideologies such as the agitations for the implementation of sharia and its attendant jihads provide the language for defining economic, political or social problems as moral problems. Kenny (1996) sums it up thus, "Muslims are inclined to support a politician who wave the flag of sharia because it is a symbol of Islam and a politician who promotes Islam will be expected to share generously the national to Muslims" (361).

## Conclusion

The offshoots of the Usman dan Fodio's 1804 jihad began notably with the formations of covert religious militancy in the 1980s, down to the period from 1999 and until date. All these movements have witnessed a dramatic turn of events in their quest to engage in *jihadism* but the deadly groups among them are Maitatisine and Boko Haram who has through their jihadist activities unleashed unbearable terrors on Nigerians. The internecine crises are raging unabated with its damaging consequences on the social, political and economic lives of the country. In that process, unbearable loss of innocent lives and untold hardships are often meted out to the citizens. As it is, the country is gripped with an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty that virtually all citizens have found it difficult to go about their normal day-to- day lives without great anxiety and trepidation because of the insurgency. These are unsavoury developments for Nigeria as this state of affairs portends great danger for a country that has been at war with itself over matters of even sovereignty. In spite of the abundant natural, economic and human resources in the country, her religio-political economy leaves more people despaired than hopeful. Little wonder the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and keen observers, have been making repeated but disturbing prediction that Nigeria risked disintegration. Today because of jihad, Nigeria has been brought face to face with the similar situations and factors that led to the 1966/1970 fratricidal war between Nigeria and the Republic of Biafra.

### **Suggestions**

Living in a multi-cultural society demands many factors such as tolerance, mutual understanding and patience. The adoption of collaboration, communication, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, tolerance, patience and due process are veritable strategies of managing crises in an ideal society. The retaliatory mentality among the people should be disabused. All hands must be on deck to avoid those factors that trigger the quests for launching jihads. Let there be compensations for both human and material losses people have incurred because it can discourage revenge. The principles of conflict management such as collaboration, communication, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication and other strategies of managing crises and settling differences in a multi cultural and religious society should be vigorously pursued.

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